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---ooOoo--REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,

vs.

No. 23860

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a determination by the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from a decision of the Utah Transportation Commission that
two outdoor advertising signs owned by Appellant were illegally erected and would be removed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Second District Court, the Honorable J. Duffy
Palmer, Judge, dismissed Appellant's appeal for the reason
that the appeal was not timely filed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a ruling of this Court affirming
the decision of the District Court.
STATE~~NT

OF FACTS

A hearing was held before Commissioner Charles
Ward of the Utah Transportation Commission in December of 1971
as to the status of two outdoor advertising signs owned by Appellant.

On September 16, 19 77, the Transportation Commissior

issued its findings, conclusions, and decision in the matter,
finding that the signs were unlawful and ordering that they
be removed.

Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal,

dated October 20, 1977, with the Second District Court, also
requesting a trial de novo in the matter.

Respondent fileda

motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Following oral argument and the submission of memoranda of
points of law by both parties, the District Court issued its
Memorandum Decision and Order on January 24, 1978, dismissing
the appeal because it was not timely filed.

The present ap-

peal to this Court followed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT
LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR APPELLANT'S
APPEAL IN THIS MATTER, BECAUSE APPELLANT'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED MORE THAN 30
DAYS AFTER THE DECISION OF THE STATE TRANSPORTATION CQr-lMISSION IN THE ~iATTER, CONTRARY
TO SECTION 27-12-136.9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, AS AMENDED.
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, a section of the Utah Outdoor
Advertising Act, provides that the owner of an illegal outdoor advertising sign may request an administrative hearing
before the Utah Transportation Commission, "to show cause
why the sign should not be removed."

An appeal may be taken

from the Commission's determination, as further provided in
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9:
The decision of the commission may be appealed
to the district court in the county in which
the sign is located. The court shall sustain
the decision of the commission if it is supported by substantial evidence as shown by the
records, exhibits and transcripts.
If there
is no appeal from the commission's decision or
if the commission's decision is affirmed, the
sign owner, landowner, or occupant of the land
shall be liable for all costs incurred by the
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commission, including the transcript fees.
Appeals shall be taken within 30 days of the
commission's decision by filing a notice of
appeal and senctlng a copy of the notice to
the commission. (emphasis added) .
The statute clearly indicates that the deadline fc
filing an appeal from a decision of the Commission falls
thirty days from the decision, not thirty days from the receipt of the notice of decision by the appellant.

The statu-

tory language is unambiguous, and is therefore not susceptibl
to statutory construction or interpretation aimed at making
it say what it does not.

Appellant has conceded that its

notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the
Commission's decision in the matter (Appellant's Brief, page
and that it received notice of the Commission's decision well
within the thirty-day period, that is, "nearly 14 days from
the date of the decision ... "

(Appellant's Brief, page 7).

Failure to file a notice of appeal in a timely manner is a
jurisdictional defect, and the District Court correctly rulec
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant's appeal in thE
matter.
Decisions of this court have repeatedly approved
the principle that deadlines for initiating appellate review
are not mere technicalities which may be ignored by the cour:
and that the failure to meet such deadlines is a j urisdictio'
defect which will result in dismissal of t.he attempted appea

-

3 -
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For example, in Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282
P.2d 845 (1955), an appeal fron a denial to vacate a contempt
order was dismissed, because the notice of appeal was not filed
with the district court until one day beyond the one-month
limit for notice of appeal which applied in that case.

In re

Estate of Ratliff, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967), this
Court declined to entertain an appeal from a denial of a
motion for new trial, because the proper filing fee was not
paid within the one-month deadline, and therefore the appeal
was not timely filed.

Similarly, in Watson v. Anderson, 29

Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973), the Court refused to hear
an appeal from a denial of motion for new trial where the
appeal was not timely filed.

In unlawful detainer actions,

the Court has also refused to hear appeals filed after the
ten-day period set by statute for such filing& e.g., Coombs
v. Johnson, 26 Utah 2d 8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971); Vickery v.
Kaiser, 556 P.2d 502 (Utah, 1976).
Courts in numerous other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that failure to comply with the time
limit for filing an appeal is a fatal jurisdictional flaw,
and have ruled that this principle applies with equal force
to appeals from determinations of administrative bodies.

For

example, in Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 153 Cal App.

2d 523, 314 P.2d 1007 (1957),

cert. den. 356 u.s. 902, 78 s.ct. 562 (1958), the Court ruled
- 4 provided
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that a state appeals board had no jurisdiction to review an
administrative decision where the appeal was mailed one day
beyond the statutory forty-day period allowed for taking
such an appeal.

The Court stated:

The general policy of our law is not unfavorable to judicial review of administrative
proceedings. But it is the policy of our
law that time limits for filing notices of
appeal in all legal proceedings must be
complied with literally and exactly. This
is generally held to be a jurisdictional
prerequisite.
(Citations omitted).
This court can see no reason why appeals in
administrative tribunals should be governed
by any other rule.
Id. at 1009. *
In Butler v. Insurance Department, 6 Ore.App. 241, 487 P. 2d
103 (1971), the court similarly denied the petitioner's right'
to judicial review of an administrative determination, for
failure to file a petition for review within the statutory
sixty-day period.

In Varnes v. Lentz, 30 Ill.App. 3d 806,

332 N.E. 2d 639, 642-3 (1975), the Court stated that the

*

3~&

Another holding of the Hollywood Circle case, that a sectic
of the California Code of Civil Procedure dealing with service by mail did not apply to administrative proceedings,
was subsequently overturned in Pesce v. Department of Ale~
Beverage Control 51 Cal. 2d 310, 333 P.2d 15, 17 (1958). H
ever, neither the Pesce case, nor any other case of which
Respondent is aware, questioned the policy and language of
the Hollywood Circle case cited above.

-
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limit for notice of appeal from an administrative determination provided for in the Illinois Administrative Review Act
was jurisdictional, that parties could not stipulate otherwise,
and that the appellant's complaint, filed beyond that time
limit, could not be heard.

In Williams v. City of Kirkwood,

537 S.W. 2d 571 (Mo.App., 1976), where the plaintiffs were not
allowed judicial review of the administrative granting of a
permit because they failed to comply with a thirty-day filing
requirement, the court approvingly cited the following language:
The right of appeal is purely statutory and
courts may not enlarge the period in which
notice is required. Such timely notice is a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Id. at 574-5,
citing Lafayette Federal Savings & Loan
Association of Greater St. Lou1s v. Koontz,
516 S.W. 2d 502, 504 (Mo.App. 1974).
Thus, numerous cases in this and other jurisdictions have recognized that courts may not assume appellate
jurisdiction, where jurisdictional requirements set out by
statute have not been complied with.

Similarly, in the present

case, the right to appeal from a determination of the Utah
Transportation Commission is statutory and precisely the same
result should obtain.

Appellant has cited no authority from

this jurisdiction or any other in which an appeal from an
administrative hearing has been allowed where the appealing
party failed to fulfill the jurisdictional requirements of the

- 6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

statute which created the right of appeal.

Nor has Appellant

suggested any other valid reason why the clear requirement of
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 that notice be filed within thirty days of
the Commission's decision should be disregarded.
Appellant argues that the thirty-day period should
begin upon notice, despite the clear statutory directive of
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 that the period begins at the time of the
Commission's decision.

Appellant concedes that "Appellant's

appeal would have been late" if the language of U.C.A. 27-12136.9 means \vhat it says (Appellant's Brief, page 3), but
attempts to circumvent this by applying Rule 73(h) of the

Ut~·

Rules of Civil Procedure to this case by means of the Commission's purported adoption by regulation of Rule 8l(d).
argument is specious for a number of reasons:

( 1)

This

Utah Trans·

portation Department Regulation A-88-30-1: 14c, cited by Appel·
lant, applies only to the filing of the notice of appeal with
the Commission, not with the District Court.

The regulation

also expressly reaffirms the statutory mandate that notice to
the Commission shall be made within thirty days of the decisior
(2)

Rule 8l(d) states that provisions of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure apply in appealing from any order of an administrative agency, "except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal ... is in conflict
or inconsistent with these Rules."

-

7 -

(emphasis added) .
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assuming arguendo that the Rules of Civil Procedure would
allow thirty days from the day of notice for an appeal to be
filed, this would be inconsistent with U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, and
therefore would not apply.

(3)

Further assuming arguendo

that the Commission regulation may somehow be construed as allowing notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after
the notice of decision is received, such a regulation would
be contrary to statute and would therefore be void.

Further-

more, no regulation of the Utah Transportation Commission
could have the effect of granting or withholding appellate
jurisdiction to a District Court in contravention of statutory
prerequisites, nor does this regulation purport to do so.
Appellant indicates in its Brief that, in Respondent's memorandum to the District Court, "it is conceded that
where the Rules of Civil Procedure do apply, that Rule 73(h) is
that rule ... " (Appellant's Brief, page 4).
accurate.

This is not strictly

Respondent's basic argument in its earlier memorandum,

as in this Brief, was that U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 sets the time in
which an appeal of this kind may be taken, and that no Rule of
Civil Procedure supercedes that statutory limit.

Respondent

merely argued that Rule 73(h) would be more apposite than Rule
73(a) as to the question of Appellant's alleged excusable neglect, "even assuming arguendo that some one of the Rules of
Civil Procedure applies in this situation .... " (Memorandum in
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support of Plaintiff-Respondent's Hot ion to Dismiss, page 4).
Finally, Appellant in its Brief states that "it is
entirely possible" that a so-called restrictive reading of
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 may at some time result in an individual's
not being advised of the Commission's decision until his righ·
to appeal had run.

That, however, is not the case currently

before this Court.

Respondent avers and the District Court

agreed, that notice of the decision was given to Appellant
well within the thirty-day limit, and that Appellant could ha·.
filed a timely notice of appeal upon the exercise of reasonab:
diligence.

Respondent respectfully submits that this Court

must rule on the basis of the facts before it, not on the basi
of the uncertain and totally speculative eventuality posited
by Appellant.
In short, Appellant failed to meet the jurisdiction'
prerequisite of filing a notice of appeal "within thirt.y days
of the Commission's decision," U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, and therefore the District Court was correct in dismissing the Appeal.
POINT II
ASSUHING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS
NOT BARRED, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
TRIAL DE NOVO IN THE tffiTTER.
In its Notice of Appeal, Appellant requested that
the District Court grant a trail de novo in the matter.

In

paragraph 2 of its motion to dismiss, Respondent requested

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- 9 by- the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the District Court issue an order that Appellant was not
entitled to a trail de novo, in the event that the appeal was
not barred.

Counsel for Respondent argued the point at the

District Court hearing on the Motion to Dismiss.

In its

Hemorandum Decision granting the Hotion to Dismiss, the District Court made "no ruling as to whether or not under a proper
case a trial de novo should not be ordered."

Nevertheless, in

the event that this Court finds that Appellant's appeal is not
barred, and in the interest of judicial economy, Respondent
respectfully prays this Court to rule that Appellant is not
entitled to a trial de novo.
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 states that the District Court
shall sustain the decision of the commission
if it is supported by substantial evidence as
shown by the records, exhibits and transcriPts.
(emphasis added).
Regarding revie\.,r of a com:nission decision on illegal outdoor
advertising, that section also states:
The commission shall forward its records, exhibits and transcripts to the district court
having jurisdiction within 30 days after receiving notice of such appeal.
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 clearly contemplates only appellate review
of the records, exhibits, and transcripts of the administrative hearing, and not a trial de novo by the District Court.
In light of the statutory language, Respondent submits that
such a ruling would be proper for guidance of the District

- 10provided
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Court on remand, if this Court finds the appeal to have been
improperly barred by the District Court.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to meet the thirty-day juris·
dictional requirement of U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, and has

suggest~

no valid reason why the requirment should be ignored in this
case, or why, in the event an appeal were granted, Appellant
would be entitled to a trial de novo.

Respondent therefore

prays that the order of the District Court dismissing Appellant's appeal be affirmed, or if it is not affirmed, that
this Court issue a ruling that Appellant is not entitled to
a trial de novo.
DATED this

~day

of May, 1978.

~~~
STEPENJ. SRENSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Stephen M. Harmsen, Attorney for Appellant, 350 South 400
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this ,JL/0- day of May, 1978.
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